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The Feeney Decision: Bad Faith By Whom? 
To say the Supreme Court of Canada 
(the "SCC") has dealt a serious blow to 
society and law enforcement in Canada 
in R. v. Feeney 1 is a gross 
understatement. It is the position of the 
authors that the Majority did not 
comprehend the effects of this decision. 
It is certainly reminiscent of the 
catastrophe that followed in the wake of 
the Supreme Court decision in R. v. 
Askoi?- (regarding unreasonable trial 
delay). Feeney once again raises that 
age old issue of allowing a court, rather 
than an elected body, to make law and 
determine the price to be paid by society 
and innocent victims in protecting our 
individual freedoms. It is the authors' 
opinion that the Charter was never 
intended to grant the sec the broad 
powers (which the sec appears to 
exercise in Feeney) to effectively make 
laws and extend the supremacy of 
individual rights to the exclusion of any 
and all others. Feeney also raises 
fundamental questions about the value 
of life and dignity in a world where the 
Court, in the staid and detached 
atmosphere of the courtroom, second 
guesses split second decisions made by 
police officers in the imperfect and 
uncontrolled environment of the real 
world (e.g. whether there were 
reasonable and probable grounds to 
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believe Feeney had committed the murder). 
This article will canvass the issues dealt 
with in Feeney and summarize the most 
significant implications of this case on the 
police and their ability to do their collective 
job. 
Facts 
In the early morning hours of June 8, 
1991, Frank Boyle (86 years) was viciously 
bludgeoned to death in his home in the 
small isolated town of Likely B.C., 
population 300. The murder scene was 
covered in Mr. Boyle's blood. Upon 
arriving at the scene, investigators from 
the Williams Lake RCMP Detachment 
learned that the victim's truck had been 
driven into the ditch half a kilometre from 
his home. The investigators believed that, 
in all likelihood, the vehicle was driven by 
someone other than Boyle at the time of 
the accident, since Boyle was known to 
be a slow and cautious driver. The 
investigators believed that the killer had 
probably stolen it. 
The investigators learned that one 
resident, Potter, had observed Feeney, 
whom she knew, walking away from the 
scene of the accident toward his home at 
approximately 6:45 a.m. It appeared that 
he was carrying a stick or beer in his hand. 
Another resident, Spurn, told the 
investigators that earlier in the morning, 
another vehicle had gone into the ditch at 
exactly the same spot where Boyle's truck 
was found. Spurn advised the police that 
the first vehicle was owned by Feeney's 
brother-in-law, Russell, and that Russell 
had told him that Feeney was responsible 
for the earlier accident. 
Russell confirmed to the police that 
Feeney had stolen a vehicle from his 
property earlier in the night and had 
driven it off the road just down from 
Boyle's residence. Russell also advised 
police that Feeney was residing in an 
equipment trailer at the back of the 
property occupied by Russell and his wife 
(Feeney's sister). Russell reported seeing 
Feeney come home by foot at 
approximately 7:00 a.m. after a night of 
drinking. 
The investigators attended at the 
windowless trailer, knocked and said 
"Police". When no one answered, they 
went in with guns drawn (held down by 
their side). Feeney was lying on a bunk, 
apparently asleep. The senior investigator 
shook Feeney's leg saying "Wake up, 
police. I want to talk to you." Feeney was 
asked to step to the front of the trailer 
where there was more light. The 
investigator immediately saw that 
Feeney's shirt was splattered with blood. 
He placed Feeney under arrest and 
another officer read Feeney' s rights under 
the Charter. When asked if he 
understood, Feeney stated "Of course, 
do you think I am illiterate?" The 
investigators seized Feeney's shirt and 
took him to the RCMP Detachment in 
Williams Lake. 
At the Detachment, Feeney tried 
several times to contact a lawyer without 
success. The police then administered a 
breathalyzer test without telling Feeney 
that he had the choice to refuse (the 
readings were .08 and .07). Later, even 
though Feeney had not yet spoken to a 
lawyer, he was questioned. He eventually 
admitted to "striking Boyle, stealing 
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cigarettes, beer, and cash from .[the] 
residence." The police subsequently 
obtained a search warrant and searched 
the trailer, seizing a sum of money hidden 
under the mattress believed to have been 
stolen from Boyle, as well as a pack of 
cigarettes and Feeney's running shoes. 
Feeney was fingerprinted and 
photographed . the next day and finally 
contacted a lawyer. 
Issues 
At trial, Feeney's counsel asserted 
that the police violated ss. 7 (life, liberty 
and security of person), 8 (unreasonable 
search or seizure), 9 (arbitrary detention) 
and lO(b) (retain and instruct counsel 
without delay) of the Charter. In effect, it 
was argued that the police did not have 
grounds to enter the trailer and arrest 
Feeney and thus his Charter rights were 
violated. Justice Sopinka, writing for the 
majority (La Forest, Cory, Iacobucci, and 
Major JJ.) (the "Majority") concluded that 
"the police indeed violated ss. 8 and 1 O(b) 
of the Charter and the evidence gathered 
as a result should have been excluded 
under s. 24(2) of the Charter" (para. 120). 
Madame Justice L 'Heureux-Dube, 
writing for the dissent (Gonthier and 
McLachlin J.), in a stinging and 
comprehensive analysis of the Majority 
position, found ss. 8 and IO(b) were not 
violated; for different reasons, Lamer C.J. 
agreed with the conclusions of the dissent 
(for a total of four) (the "Dissent"). 
Section 8 
The primary issue in the case was 
whether the initial entry into the trailer, 
and the subsequent arrest and seizure of 
evidence from Feeney by the police was 
lawful. Section 8 of the Charter is only 
applicable if there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. In this case, there 
was agreement among the Justices that 
Feeney was entitled to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy since he was living 
in the trailer and paid rent; therefore, s. 8 
of the Charter applied. The Dissent noted, 
however, that an expectation of privacy is 
not absolute and if the intrusion by the 
police was, on the facts of the case, a 
reasonable one then it would be lawful 
notwithstanding the expectation of 
privacy (para. 22). 
The starting point in the analysis of 
whether a search violates s.8 of the 
Charter is the presumption that a 
warrantless search (i.e. a search without 
prior judicial authorization) is 
unreasonable and in contravention of s. 
8 of the Charter. 3 This presumption can 
be rebutted if: 1) the warrantless search 
was authorized by law, 2) the law itself is 
reasonable, and 3) the manner in which 
the search is carried out is reasonable 
(the "Collins Test'').4 
Lawfulness of the Arrest - Was it 
Authorized by Law? 
On the first leg of the Collins Test, 
the Majority examined the pre-Charter 
common law on arrests in dwelling 
houses. Combining various common law 
cases5 ands. 495 of the Criminal Code, 
the Majority concluded that a pre-
Charter warrantless arrest following 
forced entry into private premises was 
legal if: (a) there are reasonable grounds 
to believe the person sought is inside, 
(b) proper announcement (except in 
exigent circumstances) is made prior to 
entry (i.e. by giving notice of ( i) presence 
(knocking or doorbell); (ii) authority 
(identify as police); and (iii) purpose 
(reason for entry)), (c) the officer 
subjectively had grounds to arrest, and 
(d) objectively reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest existed (para. 139) (the 
"Landry Test"). 
The next step in the analysis was to 
determine whether the police complied 
with the Landry Test in the Feeney case. 
There was no question that the police 
had reasonable grounds to believe that 
Feeney was inside the trailer. After all, 
they had been told as much by Russell. 
The contentious issues were whether 
there were reasonable grounds to arrest, 
and whether proper announcement was 
made. 
(i) Objective Grounds for Arrest 
On this issue, the Majority held that 
the trial judge erred in holding that the 
objective test was satisfied. They based 
this conclusion on a very technical and, 
in the authors' view, specious basis (para. 
145-146). The Dissent, on the other hand, 
agreed with the trial judge that the 
objective grounds were satisfied based 
upon the information the investigators 
had gathered prior to entering the trailer 
(para. 36). 
The Dissent based this decision upon 
a number of factors including the recency 
of the murder, the nature of the community 
in which the killing took place (i. e~ rural, 
small population, and no traffic in early 
morning hours, making it very unusual to 
see someone walking away from the scene 
of accident), the fact that Feeney had 
earlier crashed a vehicle in exactly the 
same spot the victim's vehicle was 
crashed, and the reasonable inference that 
whoever killed the victim had also stolen 
his truck (para. 32). 
The Dissent concluded that the 
Majority failed to take into account the 
unique rural characteristics of the 
community in objectively assessing the 
reasonable grounds, and had instead 
examined them in a "vacuum", which had 
led them to an incorrect result (para. 
34 ). The Dissent held that while the mere 
fact of Feeney being present at the scene 
of the accident involving the victim's 
truck in the early morning hours might 
not be particularly probative in a large 
city, it was extremely probative in the 
context in which it took place (para. 35). 
(ii) Subjective Grounds for Arrest 
The Majority held that subjectively 
the lead investigator did not believe that 
he had reasonable grounds to arrest 
Feeney. They reached this conclusion 
based on two factors: (a) a very strict, 
technical and non-contextual review of 
selected testimony from the lead 
investigator (para. 142), and (b) the 
Majority's contention that ifhe believed 
he had grounds to arrest Feeney, he would 
have arrested him immediately rather than 
waiting until after seeing blood stains on 
Feertey's shirt (para. 143). This second 
point is a conclusion based not on any 
facts presented in this case, but rather on 
the particular biases of the Majority. 
There are many instances where the 
police, for legitimate reasons, do not arrest 
a suspect right away even though they 
have the grounds to do so, a fact which 
was pointed out by the Dissent (para. 45). 
In direct contrast to the Majority, the 
Dissent concluded that subjectively the 
investigators did have reasonable 
grounds to believe Feeney committed the 
murder, notwithstanding that they did not 
arrest him immediately upon locating him 
in the trailer (para. 39). The Dissent based 
this conclusion on the totality of the 
evidence given by the officer, and held 
that even though he was unable to 
properly articulate the technical legal 
terminology on this issue, that did not 
invalidate the fact that he acted in a 
manner consistent with having the 
subjective belief of reasonable grounds 
(para.43). 
(iii) Proper Announcement 
The issue of whether the police in the 
Feeney case gave adequate 
announcement prior to their entry into 
the trailer was not resolved by the 
Majority. It was unnecessary to do so, 
since the Majority had already decided 
that the arrest was unlawful for failing to 
meet either the subjective or objective 
tests for reasonable grounds. However, 
the Majority did suggest that the 
announcement was inadequate because 
the investigators "were not denied 
admission, nor did they announce their 
purpose before forcing entry" (para. 141 ). 
The authors submit that, on the facts 
of Feeney, this ruling is an absurdity, 
since Feeney was asleep and the police 
knew it. The Dissent also saw the 
absurdity of this ruling and held that: 
after knocking on the door, calling 
out "police" and receiving no 
answer, they were perfectly entitled 
to assume that [Feeney] was either 
asleep or ignoring their requests to 
enter ... it would have been useless 
for them to have called out their 
purpose for entry. On the contrary, 
the only effective way to satisfy the 
notice requirement was to suspend 
its delivery until [Feeney] was in a 
position to receive it. (para. 55) 
Lawfulness of the Arrest - Is the Law 
Itself Reasonable? 
The Majority next considered whether 
the second leg of the Collins Test was 
satisfied (i.e. whether the law itself was 
reasonable). Shockingly, the Majority held 
that "even if the police met the standards 
of .Landry and the other cases, a 
warrantless arrest in the circumstances of 
the case at bar following a forcible entry 
is no longer lawful in light of the Charter'' 
(para. 152). 
Although the Majority conceded that 
the Landry Test attempted to strike a 
proper balance between society's 
interests and individual privacy interests 
(para. 157), they concluded that it no 
longer properly protected the privacy 
interests of the individual because 
somehow the importance of privacy of the 
home had increased "significantly" with 
the advent of the Charter (para. 15 8). This 
was a stunning revelation since the 
Landry Test has been applied by the 
police and accepted by the courts for the 
14 years since the Charter's inception. 
The Dissent did not consider the 
constitutionality of the Landry Test 
generally. The Dissent did rule, hQwever, 
that the Landry Test would constitute a 
reasonable limit on a person's expectation 
of privacy, even in light of the Charter, in 
some cases. 
The New Rule 
According to the Majority, it is now 
insufficient to comply with the Landry 
Test or have an arrest warrant to enter a 
residence for the purpose of arrest. In 
order to satisfy the trespass issue 
inherent in the right to privacy, a warrant 
must also be obtained which identifies the 
dwelling house to be searched and 
specifically gives authorization to enter 
for the purpose of arrest (i.e. a "warrant 
of entry"). Recognizing that there is no 
provision in the Criminal Code for such 
a "warrant of entry", the Majority held: 
If the Criminal Code currently fails 
to provide specifically for a warrant 
containing such prior authorization, 
such a provision should be read in. 
(para. 163) (emphasis added) 
Apparently the investigators could 
have simply watched the windowless 
trailer while someone went to get a warrant 
back in Williams Lake (para. 167). In the 
opinion of the authors, this view is overly 
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simplistic and does not take into account 
the realities of the situation. For example, 
it assumes that in 1991 a justice of the 
peace or even a judge would have granted 
such a "warrant of entry" when no 
provision existed in law to grant it. More 
disturbing, the view of the Majority 
places the impossible onus on the police 
to see into the future and predict the rules 
that the sec will impose upon them 
retroactively. 
The Majority's arguments are not only 
unpersuasive but raise issues of their 
own good faith. There was no logical 
requirement to retroactively apply this 
new rule. Even if the Majority felt 
compelled to overrule the Landry Test, 
they could have suspended its 
application in the Feeney case because 
there was no way for the investigators to 
know about it. In the opinion of the 
authors, applying the new rule 
retroactively brings the administration of 
justice into disrepute. 
Exigent Circumstances r 
According to the Majority, the only 
exception to the new rule requiring a 
"warrant of entry" is "hot pursuit". This 
includes the situation where an officer 
arrives on the scene shortly after a 
suspect has taken refuge in a dwelling 
house, and the officer does not know the 
identity of the suspect in order to obtain 
a warrant to arrest. 6 The Majority justified 
this exception because the officer is acting 
on the basis of personal knowledge. The 
Majority did not believe, however, that 
the facts of Feeney supported "hot 
pursuit". 
Interestingly, the Majority refused to 
address the concept of "exigent 
circumstances" as delineated from "hot 
pursuit" as an exception to the new rule, 
but stated ominously, "I do not agree with 
[the Dissent] that exigent circumstances 
generally necessarily justify a 
warrantless entry-- in my view, it is an 
open question" (para. 162). In any event, 
the Majority did not accept that Feeney 
was a case of "exigent circumstances" 
involving the possible destruction of 
evidence, because the police did not 
know for a certainty that the evidence 
existed (i.e. were not acting based on 
4 
personal knowledge). 
The Dissent took a more expansive 
view of the type of situations which might 
justify a warrantless entry into a dwelling 
house for the purpose of arrest, holding 
that hot pursuit is but one example of the 
type of circumstances which could be 
considered exigent (para. 65). The Dissent 
accepted that preventing the removal or 
destruction of evidence justifies setting 
aside the strict rules concerning sanctity 
of the home (para. 72). The Dissent 
concluded that what constitutes exigent 
circumstances should not be strictly laid 
out, but rather should be dealt with on a 
case-by-case basis (par. 68). 
Section 10 
On the issue of whether Feeney was 
properly advised of his right to counsel, 
the Majority cited several reasons to 
conclude he was not. The Majority ruled 
that because the officer did not give 
Feeney the Charter the moment he 
touched his leg, "the appellant had his 
s. l O(b) rights violated" (para. 171 ). This 
ruling is incredible because it interprets R. 
v. Therens7 far more strictly than had 
previously been done. Moreover, the 
Majority ruled that the rights outlined in 
R. v. Manninen8 were violated (i.e. provide 
reasonable opportunity to exercise right 
to counsel and cease questioning until 
counsel consulted). Here, the Majority 
made an issue of the fact that no phone 
existed in the trailer, but failed to properly 
consider the fact that the accused declined 
to exercise his rights when initially offered 
at the trailer. 
The Majority also ruled that the 
Charter recitation given by police at the 
scene "did not satisfy the informational 
requirements of s. 1 O(b )"(para. 173), but 
did not state at any point what 
"informational requirements" were 
deficient. As a result, the Majority's ruling 
on this point is not instructive, especially 
considering that the trial judge and Court 
of Appeal ruled that police complied with 
s. lO(b). 
Ori the right to counsel issue the 
Dissent held that the law does not require 
the police to advise a suspect the instant 
he is detained. The Dissent held that the 
police must be given some latitude to 
assess and gain control of a situation 
before proceeding (para. 100). In the 
present case, the Dissent found the 
following factors made it reasonable for 
the investigators to temporarily delay 
giving Feeney his Charter rights: (a) the 
violent nature of the case; (b) the 
uncertainty facing the officers upon 
entering the trailer as to how the suspect 
might react; ( c) they were walking into a 
dark room; and ( d) the suspect was 
apparently asleep. The Dissent 
concluded that it was inconceivable that 
the few minutes delay involved could 
amount to a Charter breach (a strong 
condemnation of the Majority's finding) 
(para. 100). 
The Warrant 
The police subsequently obtained a 
search warrant for the money, cigarettes, 
and the accused's shoes. The Majority 
ruled that the warrant was issued on 
information obtained as a result of 
constitutional violations; specifically, the 
initial entry of the trailer (unlawful arrest), 
the initial interview (unlawful arrest and 
right to counsel violation), and the 
subsequent interviews (right to counsel 
violation). Consequently, the Majority 
ruled that "the search and seizure under 
the warrant also violated s. 8." 
Fingerprints 
After the accused was taken to the police 
station, he was fingerprinted; The 
accused's fingerprints matched prints 
found on the victim's refrigerator and on 
an empty beer in the victim's truck. R. v. 
Beare9 held that fingerprinting as an 
incident to a lawful arrest did not violate 
the Charter. In the present case, 
however, the Majority held that the arrest 
was unlawful and involved a variety of 
Charter breaches. The Majority found 
there was a further violation of s. 8 ofthe 
Charter relating to the fingerprints. 
Exclusion of Evidence Under 
Section24 
Section 24(2) of the Charter allows 
for the admission of evidence improperly 
obtained, provided the administration of 
justice would not be brought into 
disrepute. Notwithstanding that the trial 
judge, Appeal Court, and Dissent found 
that the police were acting in good faith, 
the Majority not only found otherwise, 
but used unjustifiably harsh words to 
characterize police conduct in this case. 
For example, the Majority stated the 
police "flagrantly disregarded the 
appellant's privacy rights and moreover 
showed little regard for his s. I O(b) rights" 
(para. 195). Citing R. v. Kokesch,w the 
Majority stated the police must be taken 
to be aware of judicial decisions and the 
circumscription of police powers that the 
judgments represent. In this case "the 
police either knew they were trespassing, 
or they ought to have known" (para. 189). 
The significance of the Majority's ruling 
is that ifthe police do not know what the 
Courts have decided, the police will be 
deemed to be acting in bad faith. 
As a result, all the evidence (including 
the shoes, cigarettes, and money) was 
ruled inadmissible because in the opinion 
of the Majority, "The serious disregard 
for the appellant's Charter rights ... 
suggests that the admission of the 
evidence would bring greater harm to the 
repute of the administration of justice than 
its exclusion" (para. 198). The Majority 
allowed the appeal, set aside the 
conviction, and ordered a new trial. 
The Dissent is diametrically opposed 
to the Majority decision on every 
important issue in the case. While the 
Majority chastised the investigators for 
almost everything they did in the course 
of the investigation, the Dissent stated: 
... from the first stages of the 
investigation through to the 
apprehension of the appellant the 
police proceeded in a forthright and 
proper manner; indeed.,. had the 
police not moved immediately to 
arrest, it is likely that they would 
have been criticized for allowing a 
murderer to continue to remain at 
large in the community (para. 116) .... 
Given the brutality of the murder 
scene and the seeming randomness 
of the act, there is little doubt that 
the police felt obliged to act quickly 
in order to prevent further violence 
of that nature in the community. 
For this foresight, they should be 
commended, not rebuked (para. 
117). 
Implications for the Police 
The full impact of the Feeney case 
cannot be judged at this time. The most 
obvious implications forthe police are: 
1. The Landry Test will no longer apply 
as a general rule. The new rule is that 
"warrantless arrests in dwelling houses 
are prohibited," except in the case of 
"hot pursuit." The issue of "exigent 
circumstances" is not resolved at this 
time. 
2. An arrest without permission in a 
dwelling house is only authorized where 
either: 
a. police have an arrest warrant, 
have also obtained a "warrant of 
entry" and have made proper 
announcement before entering; or 
b. the police are conducting an 
investigation but have not yet 
obtained a warrant for arrest. In 
these cases, the police must 
comply with the Landry Test, 
obtain a "warrant of entry" and 
make proper announcement before 
entering. 
3. The "warrant of entry" must be based 
upon reasonable and probable grounds 
to believe the suspect is within the 
specified premises at the time the 
warrant is sought. It must identify the 
address to be searched and specifically 
authorize entry into that premises to 
search for the suspect (whether named 
ornot). 
4. Authority for the issuance of such a 
warrant of entry does not exist in the 
Criminal Code. As an interim measure 
it appears that s. 487 warrants may be 
utilized with some modifications. Check 
with your department for direction on 
this issue. In the long-term, the federal 
government may consider amendments 
to the Criminal Code to address any 
statutory deficiencies. 
5. The meaning of detention/arrest may 
have been expanded because the Majority 
concluded that it arises at the moment of 
detention. (i.e. in Feeney the moment the 
investigator touched Feeney' s leg). If this 
is the case, then police officers may have 
to begin reciting a suspect' s rights under 
the Charter as soon as they initiate 
contact with a suspect, regardless of other 
considerations such as the police officer's 
safety. The Dissent in Feeney found that 
there is some justifiable latitude as to when 
the Charter be given. Hopefully, the SCC 
will provide clarification on this issue and 
hopefully the view of the Dissent will 
prevail. 
6. The definition of"bad faith" may have 
been expanded to include situations where 
the police act contrary to a court ruling 
because they are unaware of it. In Feeney, 
the Majority made it clear that the police 
"ought" to know what the Courts have 
decided. If not, according to the Majority, 
the police will be deemed to be acting in 
bad faith. This ruling should be a "wake-
up" call to police management that 
someone within each police agency must 
be designated to monitor case Jaw, and 
front line officers must be provided with 
frequent legal updates to ensure their 
compliance with both statutory and case 
law. 
Conclusion 
It appears to the authors that the 
Majority judged the police with 
unnecessary harshness (but, 
paradoxically, never criticize the murderer). 
In this case, the police were investigating 
the most serious of all crimes in the field, 
acting quickly in order to apprehend the 
offender (which is in the interests of all 
individuals in society}, without the benefit 
of hindsight and law clerks researching 
the law at their leisure. Significantly, the 
trial judge, the Court of Appeal, and four 
justices of the sec found, in hindsight 
and with great deliberation, that the police 
were acting properly. Further, it appears 
that the Majority analysis occurred in a 
judicial vacuum unconnected to 
investigative, operational and common 
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direction to the police on fundamental interests of the innocent as a priority. 
issues. R. v. Stillman 11 is another recent Ironically, the Majority talks of the 
case where the sec rendered a decision importance of "increased protection of 
which fundamentally fails to provide privacy of the home" , but what about 
guidance to the police, in particular on the "privacy" of the victim, Mr. Frank 
the issue of exclusion of evidence under Boyle, and what about increased 
s. 24 (2) of the Charter. The result has protection for each individual of society? 
been complete chaos. Such divisive and In a letter to the Vancouver Sun, 13 
impractical decision making and conduct Richard and Leona Heard, members of the 
by the sec makes the job of the police victim's family wrote: 
(not to mention lawyers and judges) 
extremely difficult. It also renders unfair 
the opinion expressed by the Majority in 
Feeney that the police ought to know the 
common law or else be deemed to be 
acting in bad faith, since the law is so 
difficult to decipher from sec decisions. 
What is particularly disturbing about 
this case is that the Majority do not explain 
how a provincial court judge or justice of 
the peace (who do not have inherent 
authority) have the power to "read in" 
provisions. It is also unforgivable that 
such a major shift in law would be made 
without warning to the legislators or time 
to develop a legislative response. The 
authors reject the assertion of Feeney's 
counsel that the Majority was ''well aware 
of the immediate ramifications" of this 
case12• While some defence counsel may 
"scoff' at the 2, 700 cases reportedly 
affected in B.C., that number only reflects 
data from 38% of the RCMP detachments 
in B.C. and did not include municipal 
cases. The actual number of cases affected 
is much higher and the national figures 
will be in the tens of thousands. 
On June 8, 1991, our stepfather and 
father-in-law, Frank Boyle, was 
bludgeoned to death in his home in 
Likely, B.C., by an intruder who hit 
him six times on the head with a 
crowbar .... [He] was 86 years old, 
went to church each Sunday and 
took mail to people who couldn't 
get out. He fed birds and 
squirrels .... Does our Charter of 
Rights allow our police 
departments to do their jobs of 
protecting law-abiding citizens of 
our country? .... How do we teach 
our children and grandchildren to 
have respect for the laws of our 
country, when they see this kind of 
decision handed down by the 
highest court in the land? ... .Is this 
Canadianjustice? Doesn'tanybody 
care? 
To Richard and Leona's question, the 
answer is found in Sopinka J. 's ruling, 
"Any price to society occasioned by the 
loss of such a conviction is fully justified 
in a free an~ democratic society which is 
governed by the rule of law" (para. 198). 
The authors suggest that society would 
not agree with the Majority that "any 
price" is justified, and we wonder with 
the Heards, "Is this Canadian justice?" 
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Finally, it appears to the authors that 
the balance between society's interests 
and the individual's privacy interests, as 
articulated in Landry, have been 
abandoned by this case. What the 
Majority has failed to understand is that 
"privacy" rights are a legal fiction unless 
one is able to enjoy the more fundamental 
right to "liberty and security". If one Reproduced with Permission from Ingrid Rice 
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New Leadership Development 
Program Leads to Degree 
Pat Lawrence 
The Justice InstitUte (JI), in 
partnership with Simon Fraser University 
(SFU), is offering a unique Leadership 
Development Program targeted to start in 
January, 1998 (the Program). The Program 
involves part-time study over a three year 
period leading to a Bachelor of General 
Studies degree - Integrated Studies 
Program with a focus on Justice and 
Public Safety Leadership. 
Leaders from among Il's major clients 
took part in a two-day planning forum last 
Fall to develop the Program's vision, 
purpose and goals. The Program is 
designed to train leaders in justice and 
public safety who will: 
• prepare for the future in a 
creative and visionary way; 
• foster inter-agency cooperation; 
• balance personal goals with 
corporate objectives; 
• mentor and coach others; 
• effectively deal with conflict and 
solve problems; 
• do the right things, not just the 
popular things; and 
• have personal credibility. 
The Program is tailored to highly 
motivated mid-career professionals with 
at least ten years experience injustice or 
public safety. This group sees the 
attainment of a university degree as a 
desirable objective for its intrinsic value 
as well as for career development. The 
Program will appeal to those professionals 
who want the opportunity to get a 
university degree while continuing to 
work full time. 
Once admitted to the Program, 
students will be placed into a team of 
individuals from other Justice and Public 
Safety organizations. This team 
progresses through a schedule of courses 
as a whole, allowing leaders to share 
experiences and form a support network 
that can be of benefit long after the studies 
are over. As mentioned, the Program is 
designed to be completed on a part-time 
basis over three years. Students take two 
courses each semester (three semesters 
per year). The current work experience of 
each student provides a rich source of 
material for the classroom. 
The first team of students will begin 
the Program next January at the Justice 
Institute campus in New Westminster. 
Future programs will be more accessible 
with some parts being delivered using 
distance education technologies. 
Entry into this Program is at an 
advanced level. Instead of having to 
complete the usual 120 credits required 
to obtain a Bachelor's degree, students 
who successfully attain 60 credits will 
receive a Bachelor of General Studies -
Integrated Studies Program from SFU. 
The 60 credit requirement is made up 
of 48 core and 12 electives courses. Topics 
in the core course of study include: 
• organizational behaviour 
• ethnic relations 
• research methods 
• human rights and civil liberties 
" conflict resolution 
• gender relations 
• human resources management 
• ethical decisions and public 
policy 
• organization development and 
change 
• public policy issues in justice 
and public safety 
The elective courses can be chosen 
from three streams: criminal justice, public 
safety and a general category. In addition 
to the core and electives, students will be 
required to complete a major project 
connected to their workplace. All courses 
will be delivered using methods that foster 
development skills in problem solving, 
teamwork, critical thinking, writing, and 
presentation. 
Tuition for the entire Program is 
$13,500, to be paid in instalments over 
three years. 
To be considered for admission into 
the Program, students are required to have 
the following: 
• some formal post-secondary 
education OR an acceptable 
combination of technical training 
plus in-house training and some 
university or continuing 
education courses 
• at least 10 years work 
experience in a relevant field 
• basic writing skills and computer 
literacy 
• support of current employer 
In the coming decades, leaders in the 
fields of justice and public safety are 
certain to face unprecedented challenges 
which require innovative and visionary 
solutions. The success a leader attains 
in tackling these problems will be directly 
related to the training he or she receives. 
The Il and SFU have created this unique 
Leadership Development Program m 
response to this need. 
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P1e•1e Ce>ntaei: · 
. . ·. · .-- , . . _ ·. 
··: .. --.-.-.. ··. . . · .<.: ·-:>·.: -: -,.-:::: 
PatLa~ene~coorclm~tor . . 
Centre for ~aclershipDe:velopmtnt 
J..sticelnstitutef>f8.C. · 
.·._,· 
••••.  T~Jephcme: SZS..55~9· 
x 1t•J:~ <$2~ss19 ••.... · .• · 
7 
Operational Notes 
R. v. Stillman (SCC) 
Ruled that evidence conscripted un-
lawfully from an accused will generally 
be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter 
(i.e. trial fairness violated). Evidence will 
be non-conscriptive evidence if the ac-
cused was not compelled to participate in 
the creation or discovery of evidence (i.e. 
it existed independently of the Charter 
breach in a form useable by the state). 
Evidence will be conscriptive when an 
accused, in violation of his I her Charter 
rights, is compelled to incriminate him I 
herself at the behest of the state by means 
of a (a) statement, (b) use of the body, or 
(c) the production of bodily samples. As 
a result, even real evidence can be ex-
cluded if the accused is conscripted into 
producing the evidence contrary to a 
Charter right. 
R. v. Godoy (Ont. C.A.) 
Police had authority to enter residence 
without permission (and despite denial 
by occupant) in response to a discon-
nected 911 call. While the police did not 
have reasonable and probable grounds 
to believe an indictable offence had been 
committed, they were obliged to investi-
gate further the distress call. Forced en-
try was justified to determine the cause 
of the distress and give aid if necessary. 
The nature ofa 911 hang-up call leads to 
a reasonable belief that someone inside 
was in serious distress and their life or 
safety could be in danger. 
R. v. Bennet (BCSC) 
Accused is not entitled to call legal 
counsel prior to submitting to a roadside 
screening test. Allowing accused to call 
a lawyer prior to test created delay and 
demand was then outside purview of 
"forthwith". Officers must be unequivo-
cal that accused is not entitled to call a 
lawyer prior to test. 
8 
R. v. Leipert (SCC) 
Identity of confidential informer or in-
formation that may tend or have potential 
to identify informer is strictly confiden-
tial and not subject to disclosure to de-
fence. The "informer privilege" is sacro-
sanct. There is only one exception: where 
the accused demonstrates that the iden-
tity of the informer is essential to proving · 
innocence. 
R. v. Whitford (Alta. C.A.) 
The Crown cannot use statements 
obtained in violation of the Charter to 
impeach an accused's credibility. This is 
contrary to the B.C.C.A. in R. v. Cook 
which held that a statement obtained in 
violation of the Charter could be used 
provided it was not used to incriminate 
as part of the Crown's case. 
R. v. Calder (SCC) 
Held that a statement obtained from 
the accused in violation of the Charter is 
inadmissible as part of the Crown's case 
to challenge credibility. 
R. v. Goodwin (BCCA) 
There is no requirement that a com-
plainant suffer ill health or a major disrup-
tion in his I her life to obtain protection 
against criminal harassment. 
R. v. Carosella (SCC) 
The loss or destruction of evidence 
against an accused can be grounds for a 
stay of proceedings under the Charter. 
The loss or destruction of evidence can 
affect the ability of an accused to make 
full answer and defence as provided bys. 
7 of the Charter. 
R. v. Mitchell (BCSC) 
Court ordered a stay of proceedings 
where a hospital had destroyed the blood 
sample of a sexual assault victim. The vic-
tim was taken to the hospital by police 
where a "rape kit" was utilized. A blood 
sample was taken. It was later destroyed. 
The accused argued the sample was cru-
cial to showing the complainant's intoxi-
cation level. The Court found there was 
a reasonable possibilityllianhe .iQforma-
tion contained in the sample wa8 logi-
cally probative to an issue at the trial (i.e. 




The British Columbia Institute of 
Technology is pleased to announce a 
new part-time• Forensic Science 
Technology Program. . 
Advanced Specialty Certificates include: 
Essentials of Criminalistics, Forensic 
Science Studies and Commercial Crime 
Studies. 
*eYerrings & weekends 
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